Judicial Activism in the European Court of Justice – The Case of LGBT Rights by de Waele, Henri & van der Vleuten, Anna
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE — THE CASE OF LGBT RIGHTS 
Henri de Waele* and Anna van der Vleuten‡
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 639 
I. THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS ... 642 
A. Jurisdiction, Composition, and Case–Load .................................. 642 
B. Landmark Rulings and Overall Performance ............................... 643 
1. Supremacy, Direct Effect and State Liability ...................... 643 
2. Extending its Judicial Review Competence ......................... 645 
3. Entrenching the Internal Market ......................................... 647 
4. Proclaiming Absolute Autonomy ......................................... 648 
II. THE ACADEMIC DEBATES ON THE ROLE OF THE COURT ....................... 649 
A. The Debate in Legal Doctrine ...................................................... 649 
B. The Debate in Political Science .................................................... 651 
III. THE CASE OF LGBT RIGHTS ................................................................ 653 
A. LGBT Rights in European and National Context ......................... 653 
B. Transgender Rights ....................................................................... 655 
C. Lesbian and Gay Rights ............................................................... 657 
IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 663 
 
INTRODUCTION
The European Court of Justice (“the Court” or “the ECJ”) is a unique 
court in many respects. It is the central dispute settlement body of the 
European Union (“EU” or “the Union”)—an international organization that 
displays a mix of supranational and intergovernmental characteristics.1 It is 
considerably weaker than domestic courts in national states—for example 
where it concerns ensuring compliance with its judgments. However, it is in 
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European Institutional Law, University of Antwerp, Belgium.
† Associate Professor of European Integration, Institute for Management Research, 
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 1. The ECJ is sometimes confused with the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), which is based in Strasbourg (France) and connected to the Council of Europe, an 
intergovernmental organization that encompasses forty–seven Member States, ranging from 
Iceland to Russia. The ECtHR mainly deals with claims of violations of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), lodged by individuals against a Member State of the 
Council of Europe.  
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comparison much more powerful than other international tribunals, for 
example the International Court of Justice.  Small wonder then that the ECJ 
has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, which is all the more 
warranted in light of the fact that it has—over the years—managed to carve 
out its own domain and place itself in a leading position vis–à–vis the courts 
and governments of the EU Member States.2   
In the political arena, the ECJ has occasionally caught flak—for instance 
in 1979, when the prominent French MP Michel Debré accused the ECJ of 
“mégalomanie maladive” (“pathological megalomania”).3 A more 
measured, but equally vehement account was given by Margaret Thatcher, 
who proclaimed in June 1993 that “some things at the Court are very much 
to our distaste.”4 In the 1980s, some scholars started to criticize the activism 
and seemingly political role of the Court, wondering whether it was 
“running wild.”5 Former ECJ Judge Federico Mancini admitted that “judges 
are usually incompetent as lawmakers,”6 but argued in favor of the Court’s 
activism nonetheless by pointing at the quasi–permanent stagnation of the 
European integration process in the 1960s and 1970s.  Moreover, he 
expected it to take a step back after 1986, when a rélance européenne 
(“European re–launch”) was staged with the signing of a new treaty, the so–
called Single European Act.7 However, this constituted not so much the end, 
but rather a re–launch of the debate—this time also involving political 
scientists. 
Interestingly, there seems to exist a disciplinary division of labor. The 
legal debate has so far focused predominately on the relationship between 
European law and national law, and the way in which the ECJ has 
(re)shaped the latter to the benefit of European law—“constitutionalizing” 
the treaties along the way. Indeed—especially in the field of human rights—
the ECJ seems to behave more like a supreme court in a federal state than as 
a dispute settlement tribunal of an international organization. In contrast, the 
political science debate has mostly revolved around the question of whether 
the legal system and the ECJ’s conduct were consistent with the interests of 
the most powerful EU Member States,8 or whether the Court “upgraded the 
  
 2. A famous investigation of its early path–breaking case law is Eric Stein, 
Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 
(1981).   
 3. Assemblée Nationale, Sixième Législature, Séance du 1er Juin 1979, 4610 (Fr.).   
 4. 546 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1993) 560 (U.K.).   
 5. Probably the most famous early critic is HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND 
POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL 
POLICYMAKING (1986).   
 6. G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 595, 612 (1989).   
 7. Id. at 613.   
 8. See, e.g., PAUL TAYLOR, THE LIMITS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1983); Geoffrey 
Garrett, International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community’s 
Internal Market, 46 INT’L ORG. 533 (1992); Geoffrey Garrett & Barry Weingast, Ideas,
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common interest”—even against the wishes of the national governments.9
By consequence, legal scholars tend to give center stage to the relationship 
between the ECJ and national (ordinary, supreme, and constitutional) 
courts, but they “ignore or assume” the political impact of the ECJ10—
whereas political scientists concentrate largely on the relationship between 
the ECJ and the governments of the Member States.  
This Article forms an interdisciplinary effort in which we try to combine 
both perspectives and examine how the ECJ—with the support of lower 
domestic courts—has carved out its domain at the expense of both 
governments and national constitutional and supreme courts. Contrary to the 
orthodox opinion—adhered to in legal doctrine as well as in political 
science—we offer conclusive evidence that the ECJ is neither an innocuous 
interpreter of treaty rules nor an agent of particular national interests, but 
that it instead follows a distinct policy agenda defending first of all the 
interests of citizens, not of Member States. We shall underpin this central 
argument with an analysis of the series of ECJ rulings on lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) rights. The (regulation of the) legal 
position of the LGBT minority group remains a subject of controversy in 
many a national context. So far, the competence of the EU on the issue has 
been extremely limited, and the currently twenty–seven Member States 
anxiously guard their sovereignty in this field.  Nevertheless, as we will 
demonstrate, the ECJ deftly managed to slide into place as an autonomous 
norm–setter, expanding the entitlements of LGBT individuals, and even 
awarding them more rights and benefits than their national governments 
were willing to grant them.   
Our plan of discussion is as follows. We will first engage in a general 
tour d’horizon of the position of the Court within the European legal 
system, briefly touch upon its functioning and composition, and highlight its 
overall performance up until now (Part I). Next, we delve deeper into the 
academic debates on the role of the ECJ, portraying the main lines of 
discussion in legal scholarship, as well as among political scientists (Part 
II). Subsequently, we will trace the Court’s case law on LGBT rights, 
analyzing to what extent it has functioned as an autonomous emancipator 
and transformed the subject matter at stake (Part III). We finish up and draw 
the lines together in the concluding section, wherein we will rehearse our 
main argument one more time and underscore its significance (Part IV).   
Interests, and Institutions. Constructing the European Community's Internal Market, in
IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).   
 9. Anne–Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political 
Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993), available at
http://www.seep.ccu.hu/alpsa/articles/burley.pdf. 
 10. Id. at 42.   
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I. THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
A. Jurisdiction, Composition, and Case–Load 
Despite the terseness and humility of the provisions in the original EU 
treaties that spelled out the jurisdiction, composition and organization of the 
ECJ, its role in the European integration process has been nothing less than 
seminal.11 Surprisingly, the current clause on its jurisdiction—Article 19 (1) 
of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”)—remains an almost exact copy 
of its earliest version, Article 164 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (“TEEC”), drawn up in 1957.12 According to this 
proviso, the Court of Justice “shall ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the [European] Treaties the law is observed.”13 Under Articles 
258–260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”), the Court 
rules in so–called “infringement proceedings” where the European 
Commission believes that an EU Member State has failed to fulfill its 
obligations under the Treaties. On the basis of TFEU’s Article 263, the 
Court decides in “actions for annulment,” whereby a Member State, EU 
institution, or natural or legal person contends that an adopted legal act 
violates any other European rule, general principle, or procedural 
requirement. Under TFEU’s Article 269, the ECJ is granted the competence 
to decide so–called “preliminary references”—questions on the 
interpretation or validity of EU legal acts submitted by any court or tribunal 
in a Member State—which has proven to be of extreme importance in the 
shaping of the relationship between the EU and the national legal and 
political orders. The Court also decides on a number of other actions which 
are of less constitutional significance, inter alia the action for failure to act 
(Article 265 of the TFEU) and the action for damages (Article 268 juncto 
340 of the TFEU).  
In accordance with TFEU’s Article 19 (2), the twenty–seven judges are 
appointed for a six–year term and eligible for infinite reappointment. This 
 11. The ECJ as an institution is divided into three branches: the Court of Justice (in a 
narrow sense), the General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal.  The latter two have been 
created at quite a late stage. The General Court was created in 1987, and was originally 
designated the “Court of First Instance.” The Civil Service Tribunal was created in 2006.  
Our analysis pertains to the Court of Justice as it has exclusively dealt with all the LGBT 
cases so far. The two younger branches still enjoy only a limited jurisdiction, and are 
subordinated in almost every respect. 
 12. Which, in turn, was a copy of Article 31 of the 1951 Treaty of Paris that 
established the European Coal and Steel Community.    
 13. At present, the plural “Treaties” refers to the “Treaty on European Union” and 
the “Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.” The latter is the successor to the 
“Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,” which was renamed in 1992 to 
“Treaty establishing the European Community” or “EC Treaty.” All current and earlier 
versions of the treaty–texts are available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm (last 
visited May 31, 2010). 
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entails the risk that they are insufficiently independent, compared to their 
counterparts in the highest national courts; for example, a proper contrast 
would be the life–tenure of the justices of the US Supreme Court. 
Moreover, until recently there existed only a very summary selection 
process whereby a Member State merely had to propose its candidate to the 
other Member States; thereafter, the nominated person was always 
appointed to the Court without much (public) discussion.14
As the members of the ECJ all come from different Member States, the 
various legal traditions are thought to be represented in equal fashion.15 This 
reflects the political concern to ensure the legitimacy of Court decisions 
throughout the Union, but it carries yet another danger that the judges 
remain too intimately affected by their particular national background.  All 
the same, these possible risks and objections have so far never led to any 
substantial alterations in the composition or nomination process. 
The EU has no system of docket control, leave for appeals, or other types 
of case–filtering mechanisms. By consequence, the ECJ is unable to control 
the type of cases that come before it, and it has to cope with an impressive 
workload.16 Among the less significant issues to adjudicate are the 
classification of goods for customs purposes and the establishing of simple 
and overt violations of rules contained in the European treaties and 
legislation. Conversely, of spectacular importance are its decisions 
involving the demarcation of Union versus Member State competencies, the 
choice of the proper legal basis for legislation, and the definition of key 
terms and concepts coined in (established or novel) rules of EU law.   
B. Landmark Rulings and Overall Performance 
1. Supremacy, Direct Effect and State Liability 
Although fifty years ex post facto, any analysis of the Court’s influence 
on the European integration process ought to start in the early 1960s. The 
 14. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 255, Mar. 30 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. Since December 1, 2009, 
TFEU Article 255 stipulates that henceforth, a special panel shall be convened to evaluate 
the suitability of proposed candidates. However, its deliberations take place behind closed 
doors and are unlikely to be substantial. Moreover, the panel is only rendered competent to 
issue a non–binding opinion. 
 15. TFEU Article 19 contains no requirements as regards their nationality, which has 
prompted some to come up with rather adventurous suggestions. See Tom Kennedy, Thirteen 
Russians! The Composition of the European Court of Justice, in LEGAL REASONING AND 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF EUROPEAN LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MACKENZIE-
STUART 69 (A.I.L. Campbell & M. Voyatzi eds., 1996). 
 16. Since 2007, it has received and decides about 500 cases each year.  The statistics 
are extensively detailed on the ECJ’s website: see 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2009-03/ra08_en_cj_stat.pdf (last 
visited May 31, 2010).   
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twin judgments in Van Gend & Loos17 and Costa v. ENEL18 are after all 
commonly regarded as the pristine heralds of a Court treading higher 
ground, and in these rulings the ECJ left behind traditional conceptions of 
what international judges do and are capable of. At first sight, these 
judgments do not seem to fully deserve the revolutionary epithet that has so 
often been ascribed to them. After all, in Van Gend & Loos, the Court did 
not launch an entirely new doctrine—as direct effect is not a phenomenon 
exclusive to European law.  Under different guises, and especially manifest 
in the form of “self–executing provisions,” it is also well–known to 
international law.19 At the same time, the move of the Court does retain a 
bold flavor: in its ruling, it created the possibility of invoking the rules 
stemming from a supranational origin before the national courts in all of the 
EU Member States. Thereby, it coolly pierced through the vested 
monism/dualism dichotomy, sidelined national courts, and decommissioned 
the relevant applicable rules in the various Member State constitutions.   
Likewise, Costa v. ENEL—in which the Court proclaimed that all 
European legal rules take precedence over national ones—may initially 
seem not to provide for that great a novelty. After all, a cardinal principle of 
international law is its supremacy over national law.20 Yet a sharp divide 
remains between the international and the national plane: although the 
former assumes itself hierarchically superior, most states in their national 
legal systems do not actually accord supremacy to international rules of 
law.21 Since 1964—owing to Costa v. ENEL—EU law is markedly different 
in that national legal systems—in case of conflict—are obliged to always 
award absolute priority to the applicable supranational rules.  As such, the 
judgments on supremacy and direct effect carry an indelible activist mark: 
these doctrines were not enshrined in the Treaties, but constitute pure 
products of judge–made law, created for the benefit of the effet utile of
 17. Case 26/62, Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos 
v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. 
 18. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585. 
 19. This is still insufficiently recognised in EU legal scholarship, despite having been 
pointed out by more than one author from the early 1980s onwards. See Derrick Wyatt, New
Legal Order, or Old?, 7 EUR. L. REV. 147 (1982); Bruno de Witte, Retour à Costa. La 
primauté du Droit Communautaire à la Lumière du Droit International, 19 REV. TRIM.
DROIT EUROPÉEN 425 (1984) (Fr.). 
 20. See the Permanent Court of International Justice’s Advisory Opinion in the case 
of the Greco–Bulgarian Communities, 17 PUBLICATIONS OF THE PCIJ 32 (1930) (noting that 
“it is a generally accepted principle of international law that in the relations between Powers 
who are contracting Parties to a treaty, the provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over 
those of the treaty”). See also the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion with 
regard to the Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United 
Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 34 ICJ REPORTS (1988), ¶ 57 (noting that 
“[i]t [is] sufficient to recall the fundamental principle of international law that international 
law prevails over domestic law”). 
 21. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (2d ed. 2005). 
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European law. Thus, the subsequent case law that expanded the scope and 
gist of both these notions further carried an activist stamp as well.22
The same can be said for the principle of Member State liability for 
violations of EU law. Although closely connected to the doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect, it was launched only decades after all 
legislative attempts to establish such a principle in the treaties had failed.23
Subsequently, in Francovich,24 the ECJ was happy to proclaim member 
state liability a principle that was actually already “inherent” in the 
European legal order—reining in the various particular (and often 
divergent) national rules that regulated the matter up until then.   
2. Extending its Judicial Review Competence 
With the passing of time, the Court has become the architect of ever 
more numerous institutional innovations, several of which related to its own 
competence to engage in judicial review. Again, little or no foothold was to 
be found in the Treaties for any of the decisions reached.   
To start with, the preliminary reference procedure was deployed in such 
a way as to maximize the ECJ’s role and function: in Foto–Frost25 national 
courts were declared incompetent to decide on the validity of EU rules 
themselves and obliged to bring any such questions on legality before the 
European Court. Through Haegeman,26 SPI,27 and Busseni28 it suddenly 
became possible to submit references on sets of rules that lay flatly outside 
the purview of Article 234 of the EC Treaty.29
 22. See Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 825 
(demonstrating the direct effect of decisions); Case 43/71, Politi v. It., 1971 E.C.R. 1039 
(demonstrating the direct effect of regulations); Case 41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v. Home 
Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337 (demonstrating the direct effect of directives); Case 106/77, 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978 E.C.R. 629 
(demonstrating that every national court is obliged to set aside contrary national law); Case 
11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 (demonstrating that even national constitutional rules have to 
be set aside by virtue of the supremacy of European law).   
 23. In the past, on at least three different occasions, calls were made to introduce the 
relevant rules into primary law. See Court of Justice, Suggestions of the Court of Justice on 
European Union, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, SUPP. 9/75, 17–19; see the Report of the 
European Commission of 21 October 1990 for the 1991 IGC, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES,
SUPP. 2/91, 165–69; Resolution on the Responsibility of the Member States for the 
Application of and Compliance with Community Law, 1983 O.J. (C 68) 32. 
 24. Cases C–6 & C–9/90, Francovich v. It., 1991 E.C.R. I–5357. 
 25. Case 314/85, Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck–Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199. 
 26. Case 181/73, Haegeman v. Belg., 1974 E.C.R. 449. 
 27. Joined Cases C–267 & 269/81, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. 
Petrolifera Società Italiana SpA (SPI), 1983 E.C.R. 801. 
 28. Case 221/88, European Coal & Steel Comty. v. Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni 
SpA, 1990 E.C.R. I–519. 
 29. See TFEU, art. 267. 
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Les Verts30 and Chernobyl31 represent two other paradigmatic cases. 
TFEU’s Article 173 contained an exhaustive list spelling out which litigants 
were entitled to request the Court to review the legality of an adopted EU 
legal act. The Court single–handedly decided to pry open this provision and 
broaden the catalog under the cloak of preserving the rule of law in the 
Community, owning up to the supposedly overriding requirements of the 
principle of institutional balance. In 2007, in Segi32 and Advocaten voor de 
Wereld,33 the ECJ extended its competence to review legal acts adopted in 
the politically charged domain of “PJCC” (the rules of EU law relating to 
the Member States’ police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters). 
Two years earlier, in Pupino,34 it had already exported the doctrine of 
“indirect effect” (the duty for national courts to interpret national law in 
conformity with EU law) to the PJCC. In the recent ECOWAS case,35 the 
ECJ broke yet newer ground and extended its review competence to the 
“CFSP”—the set of rules that seek to underpin a common foreign and 
security policy of the Member States. In its ruling, it declared itself 
competent to review the legality of CFSP instruments, despite its formal 
exclusion from that domain on the basis of (the former) TFEU Article 46. 
 Of course, it may be hard find fault with these judgments, since private 
persons and institutions could otherwise continue to be confronted with the 
(adverse consequences of) binding acts of public law without any effective 
legal remedy. Nonetheless, as the Court proprio motu brought these changes 
to the European edifice—corroborating these with novel rules and principles 
of its own devising—the aforementioned judgments again neatly fit an 
activist bill. Significantly, at the latest round of intergovernmental 
negotiations on treaty reform, the Member States continued to withhold 
general jurisdiction in the CFSP from the ECJ.36  Exemplary was the 
statement made by the then–chancellor of Austria, Wolfgang Schüssel, who 
remarked that “the ECJ . . . has in the last couple of years systematically 
expanded European competencies, even in areas, where there is decidedly 
no [European] community law . . . . Suddenly, judgments emerge on the 
role of women in the German federal army . . . that [are] clearly national 
law.”37 Evidently, with regard to the sensitive area of defense and security 
policies, the Member States perceived the Court to be much too intrusive.   
 30. Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1365.
 31. Case C–70/88, Parliament v. Council (Chernobyl), 1990 E.C.R. I–204. 
 32. Case C–355/04 P, Segi and Others v. Council, 2007 E.C.R. I–1657. 
 33. Case C–303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld v. Leden van de Ministerraad, 2007
E.C.R. I–3633. 
 34. Case C–105/03, Maria Pupino, 2005 E.C.R. I–5285. 
35. Case C–91/05, Comm’n v. Council (ECOWAS), 2008 E.C.R. I–3651. 
 36. See TFEU, art. 275 (1). 
 37. See Mark Beunderman, Fresh EU Presidency Attacks European Court of Justice,
EU OBSERVER (Jan. 3, 2006), http://euobserver.com/9/20621. 
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3. Entrenching the Internal Market 
The raison d’être of the original EEC was to establish an internal market 
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital was 
ensured, as well as a regime of free and undistorted competition. This still 
forms a key objective of the EU at the present time.38 In spite of all the 
progress made by means of official legislation—especially since the 
ambitious rélance européenne referred to earlier—the internal market 
would never have been what it is right now without the relevant case law 
from the ECJ.   
In the free movement of goods for example, in rulings such as 
Dassonville39 and Rewe-Zentral,40 the Court engaged in an extremely broad 
reading of the provision that contained a prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions and measures having an equivalent effect.  The same goes for 
the stern construction of identical provisions concerning the freedom to 
provide services and the freedom of establishment, in Reyners,41 Säger,42
Gebhard,43 and Centros.44 Of fundamental importance was also its liberal 
approach to the concept of “worker,” granting rights of free movement and 
social security benefits to Member State nationals wherever they reside in 
the Union—even in situations where one might seriously have questioned 
the genuine and effective character of the employment.45 The Court has 
been willing to blaze a trail with remarkable fury for the relatively new rules 
on EU citizenship as well, creating residence rights as well as social welfare 
entitlements on startlingly feeble grounds.46 In the latter line of cases, the 
 38. See TFEU, art. 26 (1)–(2). 
 39. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837. 
 40. Case 120/78, Rewe–Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 
1979 E.C.R. 649. 
 41. Case 2/74, Reyners v Belg., 1974 E.C.R. 631. 
 42. Case C–76/90, Säger v. Dennemayer & Co., 1991 E.C.R. I–4221.  
 43. Case C–55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di 
Milano, 1995 E.C.R. I–4165. 
 44. Case C–212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs– og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 ECR I–
1459. One may also point here to the groundbreaking case–law on patient mobility, sparked 
by the Court’s broad conception of what constitutes a service; see Case C–120/95, Decker v. 
Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés, 1998 E.C.R. I–1831; Case C–158/96, Kohll v. 
Union des Caisses de Maladie, 1998 E.C.R. I–1931; Case C–372/04, Watts v. Bedford 
Primary Care Trust, 2006 E.C.R. I–4325. For an in–depth analysis, see Johan W. van de 
Gronden, Cross–Border Health Care in the EU and the Organization of the National Health 
Care Systems of the Member States. The Dynamics Resulting from the European Court of 
Justice’s Decisions on Free Movement and Competition Law, 26 WISC. INT’L L.J. 705 (2009). 
 45. Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1982 E.C.R. 1035; Case 
139/95, Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1986 E.C.R. 1741; Case 196/87, Steymann v. 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1988 E.C.R. 6159; Case C–456/02, Trojani v. CPAS, 2004 
E.C.R. 1–7573. 
 46. Case C–85/96, Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I–2691; Case C–
184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’aide Sociale d'Ottignies–Louvain–la–Neuve, Case C–
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ECJ even said of Union citizenship that it was “destined to be the 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”—words that fit 
particularly well in visionary speeches of federalist politicians, but seem 
slightly out of place amidst legal vernacular. Yet when it comes to 
furthering their “certaine idée de l’Europe,”47 the judges of the ECJ do not 
necessarily feel constrained by a lack of black–letter law.   
In EU competition law, the Court did not shun an activist stance either, 
although the exact dosage has varied through the years. At any rate, the 
judgment in Continental Can48 provides singularly important evidence; in 
this case, the absence of any specific rules regarding merger control in the 
Treaties or anywhere else once again presented no bar to the creation of 
adventurous judge–made law on the subject. 
4. Proclaiming Absolute Autonomy 
Van Gend & Loos has already been touched upon, yet apart from the 
introduction of direct effect it is of course also legendary for proclaiming 
the existence of a “new legal order of international law.”49 One year later, in 
Costa v. ENEL, the Community was even pronounced to be a new legal 
order—period, and the law stemming from the Treaty (“an independent 
source of law”) as being of a “special and original nature.”50
For a long time, speculation has been rife on the exact scope and purport 
of these phrases. Various authors have questioned the newness, the 
specificity, and the uniqueness of the European legal order. A number of 
them negated the possibility of a truly autonomous system that is immune to 
the general rules and distinct from its siblings in international law.51
Scholars have pointed to the fact that the international legal order is actually 
host to many sub–systems: the EU forms one of many, and contrary to the 
Court’s assertions there is nothing revolutionary in creating an organization 
184/99, 2001 E.C.R. 1–6193; Case C–413/99, Baumbast v. Sec’y of State for the Home 
Dep’t., 2002 E.C.R. l–7091.
 47. Words employed in a famous article by Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of “Direct 
Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155, 157 (1983).  See also G. 
Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 57 
MOD. L. REV. 175, 186 (1994) (“The preference for Europe is determined by the genetic code 
transmitted to the Court by the founding fathers, who entrusted it the task of ensuring that the 
law is observed in the application of a Treaty whose primary objective is an ‘ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe.’”).
 48. Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation a v. Comm’n of the European Comtys., 
1973 E.C.R. 215. 
 49. See Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos, 1963 
E.C.R. at 23. 
 50. See Flaminio Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 593. 
 51. See, e.g., Theodor Schilling, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An 
Analysis of Possible Foundations, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 389 (1996); Trevor C. Hartley, 
International Law and the Law of the European Union – A Reassessment, 72 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 1 (2001). 
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for unlimited duration with its own institutions, competencies, and legal 
personality.52 The Court has nevertheless repeatedly stressed the full 
autonomy and independence of the European legal order and denounced 
multiple rules and conventions that threatened to clash with, cloud, or 
pollute the Union’s sui generis system.53 Still, as long as the basis of the EU 
structure continues to be located in a traditional treaty arrangement, the 
entity remains firmly rooted in international law, whether it likes it or not. It 
thus would seem unable to ever truly break free and live the dream of a 
self–contained, absolutely autonomous legal order.   
As theoretically sound as the latter considerations may have been, they 
discounted or underestimated the willingness of the Court to explode the 
linkages with international law at long last. In the recent Kadi judgment,54
the true ambit of the pronouncements in Van Gend and Costa v. ENEL has
finally been clarified. In this ruling, the ECJ dealt the final blow to the idea 
of an only quasi–separate, limited, unoriginal “new legal order.” In effect, it 
considered the general principles of EU law hierarchically superior to 
international rules and denounced the overriding authority of the UN 
Charter and Security Council resolutions. In so doing, it put the independent 
character of the Union’s legal system beyond doubt.55
II. THE ACADEMIC DEBATES ON THE ROLE OF THE COURT
A. The Debate in Legal Doctrine 
The first legal studies on the role of the Court in the integration process 
date from the early 1970s and are characterized by a mild and wholly 
benevolent approach.56  Only in 1986 did the first critical treatise see the 
light of day, when the Danish scholar Hjalte Rasmussen took issue with the 
zealous pro–integration stance of the Court, and—employing some strong 
 52. Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Idea of European International Law, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 315, 345 (2006); see also de Witte, supra note 19, at 446. 
 53. See, e.g., Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying–Up
Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels, 1977 E.C.R. 741; Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement 
Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area, 1991 E.C.R. I–6084; Opinion 1/00, 
Proposed Agreement Between the European Community and Non-Member States on the 
Establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, 2002 E.C.R. I–3493. 
 54. Joined Cases C–402/05 P & C–415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council, 2008 
E.C.R. I–6351. 
 55. J.H.H. Weiler, Editorial, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 895 (2008), has compared Kadi to
the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); in effect, the 
ECJ proclaimed the EU to be equally “domestic” as the U.S. legal system, deciding for itself 
if and how it wants to incorporate rules of international law. 
 56. See, e.g., ANDREW WILSON GREEN, POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY JURISPRUDENCE:
THE WORK OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN EUROPEAN 
POLITICAL INTEGRATION (1969); PIERRE PESCATORE, LE DROIT DE L’INTÉGRATION (1972); 
H.G. Schermers, The European Court of Justice: Promoter of European Integration, 22 AM.
J. COMP. L. 444 (1974); ROBERT LECOURT, L’EUROPE DES JUGES (1976). 
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language—accused it of regularly engaging in “revolting judicial 
behavior.”57 Rebuttals were provided by Joseph Weiler and Mauro 
Cappelletti, amongst others.58 In the course of the 1990s, two new rounds of 
discussion took place.59 For the past few years however, no new 
installments in the series have been published, and the discussion appears to 
have been terminated without having been properly concluded. Since all 
attempts at providing a critical assessment of the ECJ’s demeanor have 
themselves been the subject of hefty criticism—and the apologists of the 
Court expressed the last word on the subject—one might be tempted to 
conclude that the debate culminated in a victory for the latter. 
 Some arguments and counter–arguments have re–emerged time and 
again. When critics bring forward their evidence of a Court that keeps 
overstepping the line, a trusted demurral is that the proof tends to be 
selective and that judicial activism occurs in a small minority of cases 
only.60 As a broader defense, the apologists of the ECJ advance that it has to 
make the most of framework treaties that regulate few topics in exhaustive 
detail. Thus, the fact that something is not mentioned or not fully covered 
by treaty provisions should in itself never be considered decisive: this is 
meant to leave room for detailed new rules that the ECJ may rightfully bring 
into being.61 Moreover, since the other EU institutions repeatedly fail to 
deliver the goods, the Court is well–positioned to step into their shoes. The 
European legal system is actually intended to function in this manner, with a 
 57. RASMUSSEN, supra note 5, at 12. 
 58. Mauro Cappelletti, Is the European Court of Justice “Running Wild”? 12 EUR.
L. REV. 3 (1987); J.H.H. Weiler, The Court of Justice on Trial, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
555 (1987).  
 59. PATRICK NEILL, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM (1995) (Neill was a challenger in the first round of discussions); see also Lord 
Howe of Aberravon, Euro–Justice: Yes or No?, 21 EUR. L. REV. 192 (1996); Takis Tridimas, 
The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism, EUR. L. REV. 199 (1996); and Trevor C. Hartley,
The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European Union, 112 
L. Q. REV. 95 (1996) (Hartley was a challenger in the second round of discussions; for a 
response to Hartley, see Anthony Arnull, The European Court and Judicial Objectivity: A 
Reply to Professor Hartley, 112 L. Q. REV. 411 (1996)). See also ANTHONY ARNULL, THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE (1999) and TREVOR C. HARTLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1999) [hereinafter HARTLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS]. 
 60. See, e.g., Tridimas, supra note 59, at 200; Howe, supra note 59, at 189; Albertina 
Albors Llorens, The European Court of Justice, More Than a Teleological Court, 2 
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 373, 398 (1999). 
 61. See, e.g., Tridimas, supra note 59, at 205; Michel Waelbroeck, Le Rôle de la 
Cour de Justice dans la Mise en Oeuvre du Traité CEE, CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN  350
(1982); Charlotte Gaitanides, Artikel 220, in KOMMENTAR ZUM VERTRAG ÜBER DIE 
EUROPÄISCHE UNION UND ZUR GRÜNDUNG DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 324 (H. von 
der Groeben & J. Schwarze eds., 2003); JEAN–VICTOR LOUIS, GEORGES VANDERSANDEN,
DENIS WAELBROECK & MICHEL WAELBROECK, COMMENTAIRE MÉGRET, LA COUR DE JUSTICE.
LES ACTES DES INSTITUTIONS 16 (1993). 
2011] Judicial Activism in the European Court of Justice 651
prominent pioneering role for the Court that has to ensure that the 
integration process keeps its pace.62
At present then, a broad consensus seems to exist in legal doctrine that 
the ECJ has been faithfully interpreting the rules, legitimately filled some 
gaps, and has never engaged in excessive activism.  Rather, it has acted in 
an overall manner that has genuinely corresponded with the tasks entrusted 
to it under the treaties, and it continues to do so. By consequence, one 
cannot seriously find fault with any of the rulings highlighted in the 
previous section; the Court was expected to constitutionalize the Treaties, 
entrench the internal market, and stress the autonomy of the European legal 
order. Moreover, concepts such as supremacy, direct effect, and state 
liability fit in well with both the general system and specific treaty articles. 
However, as we shall argue in the present paper, the case law on LGBT 
rights shows how the ECJ has been a less than faithful performer, and that it 
in fact has engaged in excessive activism, structurally to the detriment of 
Member State interests. We consider the fact that the Court even felt 
entitled to do so in this politically sensitive domain—where the EU enjoys 
no substantive powers of regulation—to be most telling. To our mind, it 
forms but one illustration of its general posture, about which critical lawyers 
rightly expressed their discomfort in the earlier rounds of debate. Moreover, 
as we will be pointing out further on, none of the justifications advanced by 
the Court’s supporters can ultimately be considered wholly convincing. 
B. The Debate in Political Science 
In contrast with the early interest from legal scholars, political scientists 
only really “discovered” the ECJ in the mid–1990s. The re–launch of the 
integration process in 1986 was followed by a revival of non–state centric 
integration theories, which attributed a key role to supranational actors such 
as the European Commission and the ECJ in the integration process.  In a 
thought–provoking article, the neo–functionalists Anne–Marie Burley and 
Walter Mattli argued that the ECJ had spurred the integration process in a 
way beyond Member State control, owing to its clever collaboration with 
lower national courts.63 This marked the start of a debate with the inter–
 62. This "most–favored rationale" has been fiercely criticised in Hjalte Rasmussen, 
Towards a Normative Theory of Interpretation of Community Law, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL  F.
135, 155–59, and HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 59, at 45–58. Compare 
Michel Mangenot, Le Conseil d’Etat et l’institutionnalisation du système juridique 
communautaire 3 (Apr. 1, 2004), available at http://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/28/86/26/PDF/Mangenot_Systeme_juridique_communautaire_2004.pdf 
(commenting that the founding fathers of the EU actually designed the Court to keep the 
Commission in check).     
 63. See Burley & Mattli, supra note 9, at 63–65; see also Walter Mattli & Anne–
Marie Slaughter, Law and Politics in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett, 49 INT’L ORG.
183 (1995).  
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governmentalist (or rational institutionalist) school, spearheaded by 
Geoffrey Garrett. Garrett had argued the previous year that the Member 
States of the EU had consciously delegated authority to the ECJ to enable it 
to monitor compliance with EU rules and thus make costly agreements 
stick. He claimed (in accordance with the predominant view among legal 
scholars) that the Court has been a faithful agent of the (most powerful) 
Member States in its decisions as well.64 In a quantitative study of 2,978 
preliminary rulings, Alec Stone Sweet and James Caporaso refuted Garrett’s
claim and concluded that Member State preferences did not significantly 
influence the Court’s actions.65 Mark Pollack offered a synthesis of the two 
approaches, using principal–agent analysis; he assessed the explanatory 
value of four factors, deduced from inter–governmentalism and neo–
functionalism, constraining the ability of the Member States to control the 
Court.66
In 1998, a new round of discussion ensued. Both sides agreed that the 
debate between the two schools had “reached the limits of its usefulness,”67
as the “master–servant” distinction was too simplistic. However, rational 
institutionalists continued to focus their attention on the strategic 
interactions between the ECJ and Member State governments, aiming to 
specify under which conditions the Court will make “adverse” decisions or 
“tailor its decisions to the anticipated reactions of Member State 
governments.”68  Neo–functionalists Slaughter and Mattli, in turn, moved 
the discussion forward by disaggregating the state into separate 
governmental institutions—which interact with one another, with 
individuals, and groups in domestic and transnational societies, as well as 
with supranational institutions, “in order to explain variation in the degree 
and timing of legal integration both across countries and within them.”69
Karen Alter has extensively contributed to this line of research, 
investigating among other things the variation in the role of lower national 
 64. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 558; see also Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal 
Integration in the European Union, 49 INT’L ORG. 171, 180 (1995).  
 65. See Alec Stone Sweet & James A. Caporaso, La Cour de Justice et l’Intégration 
Européenne, 48 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 195, 221 (1998) (Fr.). 
 66. See Mark A. Pollack, Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European 
Community 51 INT’L ORG. 99 (1997). 
 67. See Walter Mattli & Anne–Marie Slaughter, Revisiting the European Court of 
Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 177, 178 (1998); Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen, & Heiner 
Schulz, The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the 
European Union, 52 INT’L ORG. 149, 175 (1998).  
 68. See Garrett, Kelemen, & Schulz, supra note 67, at 150; for an application of 
principal–agent analysis to the relations between the Court and member state governments 
(specifically on the principle of state liability), see Jonas Tallberg, Supranational Influence in 
EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability, 7 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 104, 118 
(2000); see KAREN J. ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER: SELECTED ESSAYS 
37-39 (2009) (assessing critically the usefulness of principal–agent analysis).   
 69. See Mattli & Slaughter, supra note 67, at 204. 
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courts as motors of European legal integration, and variations in the use of 
European litigation strategies.70
Despite the wealth of research covering so many aspects of the ECJ’s
performance, we still note an important gap which might hinder a proper 
understanding of the Court’s rulings in, for instance, LGBT cases. A 
significant portion of the political science research on the political role of 
the Court—both from rational institutionalist and other perspectives—starts 
from a strictly materialist definition of the Court’s interests. It assumes that 
the Court has an “institutional interest in extending the scope of Community 
law and its authority to interpret it”71 and to “promote its own prestige and 
power.”72 These assumptions ignore the non–material component of self–
interest, and thus do not allow for an interpretation of the ECJ’s behavior in 
the specific light thereof. The non–material or ideological dimension of 
self–interest stems from the basic identity of the ECJ as a guardian of 
citizens’ rights. As remarked, the Court adheres to “une certaine idée de 
l’Europe.” It thus interpreted, for example, the four freedoms (the core of 
the internal market) in such a way that they did not only imply strong 
prohibitions for Member States, but also constituted a source of rights for 
individuals. Moreover, as illustrated, it extended its own jurisdiction to 
ensure that individuals were able to assert their rights in a court of law. 
Departing from the intentions of the founders of the European Union and 
from rationalist expectations, the ECJ has not behaved first and foremost as 
an agent of Member State interests—keeping the European Commission and 
disobedient governments in check—but has served its own interests in terms 
of guardian of the rights of the “peoples of Europe,”73 the European citizens, 
even against the interests of their respective governments and national 
constitutional courts. In the debate among political scientists, this 
ideological dimension of the Court’s behavior has continued to be 
underestimated. This too marks the importance of our discussion of case 
law on LGBT rights in the next section.  
III. THE CASE OF LGBT RIGHTS
A. LGBT Rights in European and National Context 
Only forty years after the founding of the European Communities was 
the duty to protect fundamental rights inserted in the Treaties. Since 1997, 
TEU’s Article 6 states that the Union shall respect the fundamental rights 
 70. See Karen J. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power, 19 W. EUROPEAN 
POL. 458 (1996); Karen J. Alter & Jeannette Vargas, Explaining Variation in the Use of 
European Litigation Strategies: European Community Law and British Gender Equality 
Policy, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 316 (2000). 
 71. Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz, supra note 67, at 155. 
 72. Mattli & Slaughter, supra note 67, at 180. 
 73. See Mancini & Keeling, supra note 47, at 186. 
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“as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . . and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.” An explicit 
reference to sexual orientation was included as well. Based on TFEU’s 
Article 19, appropriate action may be undertaken “to combat discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation.” This provision empowers the European Commission to 
submit draft Directives; the Council of Ministers decides upon these by 
unanimity after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. In 2000, 
the Council adopted the Employment Equality Directive,74 which requests 
Member States to combat direct and indirect discrimination in employment 
on all TFEU Article 19 grounds. In 2008, the Commission submitted a 
proposal for a Directive on implementing equal treatment outside the labor 
market—again for all Article 19 grounds including sexual orientation—but
the Council still has not reached agreement on it at the present day and 
time.75 The concept of transgender rights remains completely absent from 
the EU treaties and EU legislation.   
At the national level, the legal position of LGBT individuals differs 
strongly between the various EU Member States. In five countries, same–
sex couples have the right to marry, namely in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden. In six more Member States, same–sex couples 
can have their relationship registered.76 Regarding the position of LGBT 
employees, the bulky report of the European Group of Experts on 
Combating Sexual Orientation Discrimination77 indicated that the 
implementation of Directive 2000/78/EC showed serious deficiencies. A 
follow up study pointed out that more specifically the wide scope of 
 74. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General 
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L303) 16. 
 75. Proposal for a Council Directive on Implementing the Principle of Equal 
Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Religion or Belief, Disability, Age or Sexual 
Orientation, COM (2008) 426 final (July 2, 2008). Following the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, the Commission has proposed to change the legislative 
procedure for pending proposals, in this case to replace the consultation procedure by a 
special legislative procedure where the consent of the European Parliament is required: see
Consequences of the Entry Into Force of the Treaty of Lisbon for Ongoing Interinstitutional 
Decision-Making Procedures, COM (2009) 665 final (Dec. 2, 2009).   
 76. See ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY 
DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 1 (2009), available at www.ilga-
europe.org/content/download/9913/58423/file/Council%20of%20Europe%20(Comm%20for
%20HR)%202009-04-15.doc.   
 77. See EUROPEAN GRP. OF EXPERTS ON COMBATING SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION, COMBATING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT:
LEGISLATION IN FIFTEEN EU MEMBER STATES 600 (2004) [hereinafter EUROPEAN GRP. OF 
EXPERTS], available at http://www.law.leiden.edu/organisation/meijers/research-
projects/samesexlaw.html#european-group-of-experts-on-combating-sexual-orientation-
discrimination (last visited May 31, 2010).   
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exceptions that apply to employers with a particular religious ethos clashes 
with the general principle of non–discrimination.78
Public opinion and the attitude of politicians with regard to lesbians, 
gays, and transsexuals vary along the Member States as well. Particularly in 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe (including Italy), homophobia, 
discrimination, and violence on grounds of sexual orientation constitute 
serious problems.79 Across the board, the attitude towards transsexuals is 
even more negative than that towards gays and lesbians.  
These sharply divergent situations in the Member States restrain the 
possibilities for the ECJ to review national legislation in the light of TEU’s 
Article 6; after all, it only provides for protection of fundamental freedoms 
as they “result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States.” In addition, the competence of the Union on this issue has been 
strictly delineated. Questions of gender identity and sexual orientation 
easily tread on topics of marriage and family law, in which domain the EU 
enjoys no primary competence. LGBT rights are perceived to affect “the 
cornerstone of society,” in other words national conceptions of marriage and 
family.80 The ECJ was always much aware that LGBT cases were special: 
these rulings have always been delivered by a high number of judges (the 
full court or a “Grand Chamber”), so as to ensure that these reflect the legal 
traditions of a majority of the Member States.   
We will now proceed to the pivotal issue of whether the rulings on 
gender identity and sexual orientation have truly created new rights and 
duties, whether the ECJ has acted as more than a mere mouthpiece of 
Member State wishes or Treaty rules, and whether it thus appears to have 
engaged in excessive activism.  
B. Transgender Rights 
To be up front regarding transgender rights, one may answer Part III 
(A)’s concluding questions in the affirmative. In all three cases that have 
been decided so far the Court has boldly forged ahead and enhanced the 
rights of transsexual citizens.   
 78. Developing Anti–Discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 EU Member States 
Compared, at 43 (July 2007), available at 
http://www.migpolgroup.com/public/docs/6.DevelopingAntiDiscinEurope_Comparativeanal
ysis_III_EN_07.07.pdf.   
79. See Leigh Philips, EU Shows East–West Divide on Homophobia, EU OBSERVER,
(Mar. 31, 2009), http://euobserver.com/9/27881. 
 80. How sensitive this topic is becomes clear from the fact that Poland obtained an 
opt–out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was attached as a protocol to the 
Treaty of Lisbon, for (legally unfounded) fears that ratification of the Charter could force 
Poland to open up civil marriage to same–sex couples. 
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The issue in the 1996 case of P. v. S.81 was the dismissal of a British 
transsexual. In its judgment, the ECJ took an unflinching stance and ruled 
that discrimination of a person who has undergone a sex change operation 
equaled discrimination on the ground of belonging to a particular sex, thus 
stretching the scope of Directive 76/207 on equal treatment for men and 
women.82 The ECJ rejected the view of the British government that 
dismissal of a transsexual is not a case of sex discrimination, and that the 
Directive concerned was never meant to cover transsexuals. The Court 
argued that the intentions behind the Directive were irrelevant, and that the 
general principle that sex may not play a role in the way in which someone 
is treated had to take precedence in any case. It thus expanded the notion of 
sex discrimination in Directive 76/207 so as to include discrimination on the 
basis of a sex change, and it ruled that tolerating such discrimination would 
amount to a failure in its duties to respect the dignity and freedom of that 
person.83 Unsurprisingly, this bold ruling caused quite a stir in the United 
Kingdom, as the successive Conservative governments were outspoken 
opponents of new anti–discrimination legislation. Lobby groups for LGBT 
rights had been working hard to end the political deadlock, but hitherto in 
vain.  
In 2004, the case of K.B.84 came before the Court. Ms. K.B. claimed that 
her transsexual female–to–male partner would not be able to lay claim to a 
survivor’s payment because they were not married. They wanted to marry 
but were legally not entitled to do so, since her husband was registered as a 
woman and it was impossible to change a person’s sex in the British registry 
of birth—even when a person had undergone gender reassignment surgery. 
Ms. K.B. challenged the legislation that made it impossible for transsexuals 
to marry based on their newly acquired sex. The ECJ happily took up the 
gauntlet and decided to stretch the scope of then–Article 141 of the EC 
Treaty on equal pay for women and men so that it would also cover 
discrimination of transsexuals. Pursuant to this ruling—but also due to 
intense domestic pressure—the British government reversed its course at 
last, and the British Gender Recognition Act was adopted the same year. 
Finally, the case of Richards85 concerned a British pension fund’s refusal 
to grant a male–to–female transsexual an entitlement to an old age pension 
before her 65th birthday because the funds considered her to be a man. The 
British court that referred the issue to the ECJ asked whether this was a case 
of unlawful discrimination based on Directive 79/7—an instrument seeking 
 81. Case 13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall Cnty. Council, 1996 E.C.R. I–2143.   
 82. Council Directive 76/207/EEC, of 9 February 1976 on the Implementation of the 
Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, 
Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions, 1976 O.J. (L39) 40.
83. See P v. S & Cornwall Cnty. Council, 1996 E.C.R. I-2143, ¶ 22. 
 84. Case 117/01, K.B. v. Nat’l Health Servs. Pensions Agency, 2004 E.C.R. I–541. 
 85. Case C–423/04, Richards v. Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions, 2006 E.C.R. I–
3585. 
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to combat sex discrimination in social security systems.86 The British 
government argued that the consequences for transsexuals of the 
differentiation in the British pensions act were irrelevant, yet the Court 
stated in clear terms that the contrary was true. In the view of the ECJ, this 
was a case of impermissible discrimination of a male–to–female transsexual 
who would have been entitled to a pension if she had had the possibility to 
register as a woman in the national civil registry. Therewith, the 
improvement of the position of transsexuals in the EU legal order was 
definitely secured. Coincidentally, all three of the landmark rulings 
concerned the United Kingdom, but the effects of the Court’s rulings 
resounded throughout the Union. Henceforth, the equal treatment rights and 
social welfare entitlements of transsexuals had to be recognized in each and 
every EU Member State. 
C. Lesbian and Gay Rights 
The story is slightly more complicated with regard to lesbian and gay 
rights due to the presence of one case which, at first glance, appears to 
deviate from the general activist trend. We will point out infra how and why 
the overall picture remains consistent nevertheless.   
In 1996, the case of Grant came before the ECJ.87 Lisa Grant argued that 
her male predecessor had received a yearly travel allowance for his female 
partner (with whom he co–habited without being married), whereas she had 
been refused a travel allowance for her female partner. She considered this 
refusal unfair discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation; if her 
partner had been a man, she would have received the allowance.88 The 
Court’s advisor, Advocate–General Elmer, agreed with Ms. Grant and 
referred to the principle in P. v. S. that sex may not play a role in the way 
someone is treated. To the amazement of many,89 the ECJ disagreed with its 
Advocate–General and stated that it saw no possibility to deepen the 
concept of sex discrimination so as to include discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. Instead of comparing the unmarried co–habiting Grant 
with her unmarried cohabiting predecessor, the ECJ compared her situation 
to that of an imaginary male–male couple, and applied an “equal misery 
 86. Council Directive 79/7/EEC, of 19 December 1978 on the Progressive 
Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Matters of 
Social Security, 1979 O.J. (L6) 24. 
 87. Case C–249/96, Grant v. South–West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I–621. 
 88. The argument had been made before in U.S. legal writing. See Andrew 
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994). 
 89. See, e.g., Paul L. Spackman, Grant v. South–West Trains: Equality for Same–Sex 
Partners in the European Community, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1063 (1997). 
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argument;”90 both couples would have been treated equally badly, and for 
that reason, this was not to be considered a case of sex discrimination.   
As we shall see, this “deviant case” does not represent a real break with 
the overall trend; however, it does beg for further explanation. Why did the 
ECJ choose to default on this excellent occasion to stretch the scope of sex 
discrimination further and include lesbian and gay rights? A first 
explanation would point at the potential financial repercussions of such a 
ruling. It is a fact that the group of persons benefited by P. v. S. was much 
smaller: transsexuals constitute a small minority (in the UK estimated at 
2,000 to 5,000 persons), whereas the EU has a gay and lesbian population of 
some 35 million that could have benefited from a favorable ruling in Grant.
The British government had sounded the alarm bell that “acute difficulties 
in relation to employment, pensions and social security” would arise due to 
the number of court cases that would then start pouring in,91 and the French 
government had emphasized the serious repercussions for the French social 
security systems. In only a few earlier cases had the ECJ taken the potential 
financial consequences of a ruling into account, but even there it stuck with 
its decision on principle and only restricted the retroactivity.92 In the light of 
that tradition, and considering its reputation as a staunch defender of 
citizens’ rights, it would have damaged the Court’s credibility if it would 
have put economic concerns before fundamental rights here. Consequently, 
if the cost aspects had been the true reason, the ECJ would have limited its 
ruling in time, but not in principle. 
A second explanation may be that the ECJ favored to leave ethical, 
moral, and religious issues to be regulated by the Member States, which it 
had preferred to do before.  This argument is far from convincing though, as 
the Court has equally cut across traditional views—often grounded in 
religious convictions—on multiple occasions.93
Based on the material and ideological interests of the ECJ, we would like 
to advance a third explanation for the Court’s reticence. In order to preserve 
its authority, the ECJ usually avoids stepping on governments’ and 
constitutional courts’ toes simultaneously. In fundamental human rights 
cases, it needs some foothold in the constitutions of the Member States, as 
 90. Christine Denys, Homosexuality: A Non–issue in Community Law?, 24 EUR. L.
REV. 419, 423 (1999).   
 91. Mark Bell, Shifting Conceptions of Sexual Discrimination at the Court of Justice: 
From P v. S to Grant v. SWT, 5 EUR. L. J. 63, 76 (1999).   
 92. See Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455; Case 262/88, Barber v. 
Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., 1990 E.C.R. I-1889.  In Defrenne, the ECJ limited 
the retro–active effect of the ruling with the argument that negligence of the Commission had 
misled Member States and companies. In Barber, the retro–active effect was restricted to the 
date that the facts in Defrenne had arisen.  
 93. E.g., concerning the sex of the breadwinner and the repartition of paid and 
unpaid work in the family see Bell, supra note 91, at 77; see also ANNA VAN DER VLEUTEN,
THE PRICE OF GENDER EQUALITY: MEMBER STATES AND GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 130 (2007). 
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well as some backing from the ECHR, to avoid upsetting them both. In 
Grant, both were lacking. The ECJ observed that there was no consensus 
among Member States as regards the question of whether stable relations 
between persons of the same sex were to be considered as equivalent to 
stable relationships between persons of a different sex. It also observed that 
the European Convention on Human Rights did not protect these 
relationships.94 The “juge–rapporteur,” who has the task of drawing up the 
report on the basis of which the Court makes its deliberations, was the 
Frenchman Jean–Paul Puissochet. He was very much aware of the lack of 
consensus, exemplified by the then–heated debate in France about gay 
marriage, and would later qualify the Court’s decision as not “retrograde”
but “a scrupulous picture of the state of law at that moment.”95 The ECJ 
could not find a consensus as regards the legal position of same–sex couples 
based on the constitutional provisions of the Member States in the same the 
way in which, in the 1970s, it inferred a consensus on the basis of the 
various constitutional provisions on the equal rights of women and men. In 
Grant, the Court concluded that in such circumstances, “it is for the 
legislature alone to adopt, if appropriate, measures which may affect that 
position.”96 It referred to the newly incorporated provision (with the Treaty 
of Amsterdam) that enabled for the future adoption of EU legislation that 
would tackle the discrimination of gays and lesbians.97 This seemed a rather 
skewered reading of that provision however; the reasoning employed 
seemed to provide the ECJ with exactly the intergovernmental consensus 
that was said to be lacking. Yet, the provision presented no more than an 
enabling clause, which would result in enforceable rights only if all Member 
States would agree (since unanimity was required for the approval of any 
Directive based on this Treaty article). Therefore, it confirmed the lack of 
consensus, rather than codifying a new consensual norm regarding sexual 
orientation.98
In all, even though the ECJ passed on the chance to deliver a new, 
ground–breaking ruling, it did give a clear message with regard to the 
urgent need of anti–discrimination legislation. This message was captured 
by Stonewall, the British lobby group for LGBT rights, which considered 
 94. See Grant, 1998 E.C.R. I-621, ¶  34. 
 95. Jean–Paul Costa & Jean–Paul Puissochet, Entretien Croisé des Juges Français,
96 POUVOIRS: REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ETUDES CONSTITUTIONNELLES ET POLITIQUES 161, 165 
(2001) (“Il ne s’agissait pas là d’une prise de position rétrograde mais d’une photographie, se 
voulant scrupuleuse, de l’état du droit à un moment donné”).
 96. See Grant, 1998 E.C.R. I-621, ¶ 36. 
 97. EC Treaty, art. 13 (as in effect 2005; now TFEU, art. 19 (1)). 
 98. See Kenneth A. Armstrong, Tales of the Community: Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination and EC Law, 20 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 455, 461 (1998).   
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Grant a success because it highlighted how unjust the existing legislation 
was and led to more mobilization and media coverage than ever before.99
In 2001, in the case of D.,100 Mr. Puissochet once again acted as the 
“juge–rapporteur.” In this case, the Court confirmed its ruling in Grant, and 
did not consider the registered partnership of a Swedish EU–official with 
his male partner equivalent to a marriage. The case nevertheless represents a 
step forward, as the Court confirmed its exclusive power to rule on the 
status of certain relationships. The Swedish, Danish, and Dutch 
governments argued in vain that their national rules and not the ECJ defined 
the concept of marriage and exclusively regulate what did and did not 
constitute a relationship. The ECJ followed its advisor, this time Advocate–
General Mischo, who argued that the ECJ could rely on its own previous 
definitions of relationships. According to Mischo, it would only have to 
revise its interpretation if a “broad social development” would have 
changed the situation across the EU—not in a single country—so as to 
ensure a uniform interpretation throughout the Union.101
Some years later, that momentum had apparently arrived, and the status 
of same–sex relationships was finally recognized by the Court. In 2007, the 
aforementioned Directive 2000/78 was put to the test for the first time in the 
case of Maruko.102 Mr. Tadao Maruko claimed a widower’s pension, but 
this was refused by the pension fund of German theatres as he and his 
partner had not been married. The German legislator did not allow for gay 
and lesbian couples to marry (comparable to the British legislator that did 
not allow for transsexuals to marry). Nevertheless, Mr. Maruko and his 
partner had entered into a registered partnership in 2000, immediately after 
German law had made it possible for them to do so. The ECJ explored the 
question of whether Lebenspartnerschaft and marriage could be considered 
equivalent—as argued by both the claimant and the European 
Commission—because similar duties apply to both registered partners and 
husbands and wives under German law. This same issue had arisen before 
the German Federal Constitutional Court, when in 2001 several of the 
German federated states had questioned the compatibility of the law on 
registered partnerships with the German Constitution (which explicitly 
protects the concept of marriage). The German government had hoped to 
avoid such controversy by reserving marriage exclusively for different–sex 
couples and the registered partnership exclusively for same-sex unions. The 
Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the position of the federal 
 99. See Lisa Vanhala, Anti–Discrimination Policy Actors and Their Use of Litigation 
Strategies: The Influence of Identity Politics, 16 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 738, 751 (2009). 
 100. Joined Cases C–122/99 P & C–125/99 P, D. & Kingdom of Swed. v. Council, 
2001 E.C.R. I–4319. 
 101. Joined Cases 122/99 P & C–125/99 P, D & Swed. v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. I–
4319, ¶ ¶ 42–44. 
 102. Case C–267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, 
1998 E.C.R. I–1757. 
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government, and ruled that the law did not violate the constitutional 
protection of marriage and family, as long as same–sex partnerships were 
not called marriage. In 2004, pursuant to a perceived greater social 
acceptance of same–sex unions among the German population, the law on 
registered partnerships was revised and the rights conferred were 
expanded.103 In that same year, Maruko came before the European Court of 
Justice.  
In essence, the central question in Maruko was whether one may regard 
it a case of unfair discrimination if same–sex couples do not possess rights 
they could only acquire if they would marry, when they were legally 
permitted not to do. The Court ruled that if a surviving partner in a 
comparable situation as a surviving spouse was treated differently, then this 
had indeed to be qualified as a case of direct discrimination; but that it was 
up to the referring national court to decide whether the surviving partner 
was truly in a comparable situation with a surviving spouse.104 In November 
2007, the German Federal Administrative Court decided that marriage and 
registered partnership were not similar, and that the German legislator had 
wanted them to be different. One month after the ruling of the ECJ, in a 
similar case as Maruko, it became clear that the Federal Constitutional 
Court held this opinion as well.105 It confined the question of “whether there 
was similarity” to “whether there was equality”—which it answered in the 
negative. It stated that the entitlement to benefits, bonuses, and maintenance 
allowances in a marriage is based upon the reality that one spouse has less 
earning capacity because this spouse has to take care of the children, while a 
similar situation does not exist for same-sex couples.106 However, the 
administrative court in Munich that had originally referred Maruko to the 
ECJ did not follow the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court but that of 
the ECJ, and stated that—given the evolution of German legislation—
surviving spouses and registered partners found themselves in a comparable 
situation with regard to survivor’s pensions. Consequently, on October 30th, 
2008, it decided that Mr. Maruko was entitled to a surviving spouse 
allowance.107
 103. See Kelly Kollman, European Institutions, Transnational Networks and National 
Same–Sex Unions Policy: When Soft Law Hits Harder, 15 CONTEMP. POL. 37, 47 (2009).   
 104. In previous lawsuits, German courts had taken different views as regards 
comparability; mostly the duties had been considered comparable, but not the claims to 
payments.  See EUROPEAN GRP. OF EXPERTS, supra note 77, at 211.   
 105. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court],               
May 6, 2008, 1830/06, available at
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20080506_2bvr183006.html. 
 106. This reasoning is unconvincing because payments, bonuses, and maintenance 
allowances are granted to married couples regardless of whether they have children, while 
same–sex couples with children are not entitled to receive them. 
 107. Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Bavarian Administrative Trial Court], 
Oct. 30, 2008, M12K 08.1484, available at http://www.slpm.de/fileadmin/user_upload 
/Downloads/BMF-Schreiben_Urteile/VG_Muenchen20081030.pdf. 
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In Maruko, the ECJ delivered a far–reaching judgment. It clearly wanted 
to avoid being accused of developing European rules on marriage 
(something the British government had warned against in its observations). 
When Directive 2000/78 was negotiated, several Member States had pled 
successfully for the insertion of a recital stating that the Directive “is
without prejudice to national laws on marital status and the benefits 
dependent thereon.”108  The insertion of this recital provoked strong 
reactions from interest groups as well as from the European Commission, 
who feared that all sorts of rules that benefit married couples would remain 
permanently out of reach for same–sex couples. In Maruko, the Member 
States found out that the recital protected marriage legislation far less than 
they had thought.109 In fact, the ECJ ruled that the Member States are 
competent regarding marital issues, but that they have to exercise this 
competence within the boundaries of EU law—especially within the 
boundaries of the non–discrimination provisions—including those relating 
to sexual orientation. Admittedly, the ECJ did restrict the scope of its ruling 
by labeling Maruko as a case of direct discrimination, whereas it in fact 
constituted a case of indirect discrimination (the unequal treatment was 
based on the in–itself neutral distinction between marriage and partnership). 
However, the ECJ magisterially put unequal treatment of a registered 
partnership on par with unequal treatment based on sexual orientation. It 
was able to do so because in Germany only same–sex couples are allowed 
to enter into a registered partnership. By consequence, Maruko exerts a 
maximum effect only in those countries that know a legal regime for such 
partnerships that is largely similar to marriage.110 So, while strengthening 
citizens’ rights, the ECJ did display some respect for the constitutional 
differences between the Member States regarding same–sex relations. All 
the same, it is expected that in Germany—as well as in all other Member 
States that know registered partnerships for same–sex couples—more cases 
will be coming up and be referred to the ECJ. Thus, although the saga is not 
fully complete yet, lesbian and gay rights in the EU have been vastly 
enhanced.  
 108. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L303) 16, § 22. 
 109. See Christa Tobler & Kees Waaldijk, Case C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. 
Versorgimgsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, Judgement of the Grand Chamber of the Court of 
Justice of 1 April, 2008, Not Yet Reported, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 723, 734 (2009).   
 110. Which entails that, for example in Poland—where same–sex relationships 
currently have no legal status at all—Maruko does not confer any new rights upon LGBT 
individuals. See Katharina Boele-Woelki, The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships 
Within the European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1949 (2008) (providing an overview of national 
rules and practices of EU Member States as regards the recognition of same–sex 
relationships). An insightful comparison between free movement of same–sex couples in the 
EU and in the U.S. is drawn by Adam Weiss, Federalism and the Gay Family: Free 
Movement of Same–Sex Couples in the United States and the European Union, 41 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 81 (2007). 
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IV. CONCLUSION
From four decades of case law countless examples can be drawn that 
underscore the consciously political role of the European Court of Justice. 
Even so, in EU legal doctrine this fact has still not been commonly 
acknowledged, and searching critical comments remain rare.  A pro–
integration sentiment appears to hold sway in the literature just as much as 
among the judges at the Court itself. The orthodox view remains that the 
ECJ has always interpreted the rules with prudence and in good faith, and 
that supposedly novel doctrines chime rather nicely with the general system. 
Thus, the majority of scholars insist that the overall behavior of the Court 
cannot be called into question and deny that it ever truly engaged in 
activism. The debate in political science stands in marked contrast, yet even 
there a substantial number of authors maintain that the Court—if not 
dancing to the piping of the Member States—can at least be considered a 
loyal agent that will never structurally move against their interests.  Also, 
they content themselves with charting the process and developing theories 
and explanations without posing normative questions or stressing the 
problematic side of this political jurisprudence. Unfortunately, due to the 
reality of the ever–greater barriers between different academic disciplines, it 
appears unlikely that the slowly emerging consensus in political science 
regarding the pivotal role of the Court will be spilling over to legal doctrine 
anytime soon. All the same, to those who continue to doubt the validity of 
the evidence, we would suggest taking a closer look at the various 
installments in the saga of LGBT rights, which—in our view—clearly 
demonstrate how the ECJ has managed to slide into place as an autonomous 
norm–setter that awarded more rights and benefits to lesbian, gay, and 
transgender persons than their national governments have been willing to 
grant them. 
To an American audience, the whole issue might appear to be rather 
hackneyed. After all, the discussion on judicial activism in the U.S. 
Supreme Court is almost as old as that venerable institution itself. But, one 
should keep in mind here the notion that “all judges play a political role to a 
certain extent” is a much more commonly acknowledged idea in the U.S. 
than it is in Europe.111 Moreover, judicial activism is probably much less 
remarkable in unitary states and federations, but the EU is still an 
international organization, albeit one that—as remarked in our 
introduction—displays a curious mix of supranational and 
intergovernmental elements. The main difficulty one should have with 
 111. Equivalents of, for example, RICHARD NEELY, HOW COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 
(1981) or ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW (1997) have never been published on the other side of the Atlantic. 
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judicial activism lies in the famous “countermajoritarian problem,”112 which 
poses a comparatively greater problem in the European Union than in the 
United States for example. The legitimacy of the ECJ is much weaker than 
that of a supreme court or constitutional court in a federal or unitary state to 
begin with—as there exists no homogeneous body politic, no “European 
people” in the same way that there is an “American people” on whose 
shared values the Court may rely when it churns out ground–breaking case 
law. In comparison, Lawrence v. Texas113 was without doubt a landmark 
ruling in the U.S. on both the federal level and for the individual states. But, 
for the twenty–seven Member States of the EU—which retain a much 
higher degree of sovereignty vis-à-vis their Union—the impact of cases 
such as P. v. S. and Maruko was considerably greater. True, the ECJ and the 
U.S. Supreme Court face the same difficulty in having to find the correct 
balance in shaping and molding constitutional rules in a centrifugal or 
centripetal way. Yet the European experiment appears the more remarkable, 
since it involves a dispute settlement body of an international organization 
forging ahead and managing to secure the competence for calling the shots 
all by itself.114 The European Court of Justice has assumed the role of a 
federal constitutional court, although the EU lacks a constitution and is 
neither a federation nor likely to become one on short notice. Even if a 
certain measure of judicial activism has proven to be inevitable in any 
modern legal system where legislators simply cannot regulate all matters 
exhaustively, there still seems to be cause for concern where a court 
engages in bouts of excessive activism, which is precisely where the shoe 
pinches with regard to the ECJ.115
It might be tempting to think that the EU’s top judges must ultimately 
have enjoyed the support of a majority of Member States, for otherwise it 
would have experienced a political backlash and court–curbing initiatives 
would have been deployed long ago already.  The great failing in this line of 
reasoning lies in the fact that it takes little account of the complexity of the 
Treaties’ amendment regime. In accordance with TEU’s Article 48, the 
Treaties can only be amended when all the Member States agree to this, and 
 112. The classic term coined by ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 18 (1962). 
 113. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 114. The textual assertion is made with all due respect for the audacious move of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing 
judicial review). For an interesting comparison between this case and the decision of the ECJ 
in Van Gend & Loos, see Daniel Halberstam, Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Marbury
and Van Gend, in THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF EU LAW: REVISITING THE CLASSICS ON THE 
50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY 26 (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loïc Azoulai eds., 
2008). 
 115. An attempt to convey this message to a Dutch–language readership, emphasizing 
the important distinction between (acceptable) activism and (unacceptable) excessive 
activism was made in HENRI DE WAELE, RECHTERLIJK ACTIVISME EN HET EUROPEES HOF VAN 
JUSTITIE (2009). 
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any amendments can only take effect when all Member States have ratified 
them in accordance with their national constitutional provisions. Thus, if a 
judgment of the ECJ interprets a Treaty rule in an awkward or misguided 
way, unanimity is required among the Member States in order to reverse it: 
one lone dissenting voice is enough to uphold the unwanted judgment and 
the eventual undesired consequences thereof.116 So, normally unanimity is 
required to change the Treaties, but if the Court through its verdict 
materially amends them, unanimity is required to reverse this. Moreover, 
due to the fact that every Member State needs to ratify an amendment 
reversing a Court judgment successfully, and considering that the EU has 
been absorbing numerous new members in the past decade (a process likely 
to continue in the coming years), it appears increasingly unlikely that the 
Treaties will be amended again in the foreseeable future.117 This guarantees 
the failure of any attempts at Court–curbing initiatives since the necessary 
consensus among the Member States will be nearly impossible to attain.   
Finally, one could riposte that since our evidence amounts to only a 
small number of cases, there surely can be no question of such a higher and 
more objectionable form of activism. After all, the Court annually decides 
hundreds of cases, where we have demonstrated that it has gone beyond the 
limits of its judicial task in only a handful of rulings at most. A similar 
 116. Secondary EU law can be adopted by a qualified majority of the Council of 
Ministers. However, due to the hierarchy of norms, such rules are of little use when the 
desire is to counter unwelcome ECJ interpretations of primary law (the Treaties). Moreover, 
the Commission would have to propose such measures, Parliament would have to approve as 
well, and the attainment of even a qualified majority can still prove rather difficult. The 
hardships recently experienced in the attempted adoption of a new Working Time Directive, 
necessitated by the Court’s judgment in Case C–151/02, Landeshauptstadt Kiel v. Norbert 
Jaeger, 2003 E.C.R. I–8389, illustrate the general point (no agreement on a new Directive 
could so far be reached). See also Karen J. Alter, Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?:
European Governments and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG., 121, 136 (1998) 
(“EC law based on regulations or directives can be rewritten by a simple statute that, 
depending on the nature of the statute, requires unanimity or qualified majority consent. A 
few of the Court’s interpretations have been rewritten in light of their decisions, though 
surprisingly few. This is because ECJ decisions usually affect member states differently, so 
there is not a coalition of support to change the disputed legislation.”).
 117. See Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU
LAW 321, 332 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 1999) (“Those who have the power to 
destroy or cripple institutions will only do so if the marginal gains exceed the marginal costs 
of doing so. At any given moment the potential costs in disturbance to the Community 
institutions as a whole entailed by moving against the Court were likely to appear to each 
Member State to far outweigh the particular costs being imposed on it by the Court at the 
moment.  Only if the Court had conducted itself in such a way as to suggest that it would act 
consistently case–by–case to pile up greater and greater costs against one member or set of 
members would the cost benefit calculus of some members have turned against it . . . .The 
ECJ’s case–by–case method of decision–making both made it difficult for any Member State 
to anticipate whether its long–term losses from the Court would be greater than its long–term 
gains and allowed the Court constantly to tinker with its cost–benefit yields to each member 
so as to avoid any of them concluding that it is clearly worth initiating decisive action against 
the Court.”).
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argument has cropped up in every single debate among legal scholars.118 By 
way of rebuttal, we are inclined to quote Ovid’s maxim that “the drop 
hollows out the stone by frequent dropping.”119 Also, one may draw a crude 
analogy with a physician who—in alternation—heals and kills patients; the 
killing does not become any more acceptable or soothing because there are 
many more instances of healing. Thus, judgments in which the ECJ has 
been excessively activist, in which clear and unequivocal rules have been 
extremely bent or stretched, remain eo ipso reprehensible, even if they make 
up only a small minority of all decided cases overall. Moreover, as said, the 
fact that the Court dared to engage in activism in this politically sensitive 
domain—where the Member States deliberately refrained from transferring 
their sovereign legislative competencies—is in itself most telling, and to our 
mind forms an excellent illustration of its general posture. 
To be sure, our aim has been to increase the awareness of the political 
role of the European Court of Justice, and we sought to furnish irrefutable 
proof in the form of the case law on LGBT rights. We would not venture to 
suggest that the Court never exercises restraint. Yet, it should be admitted 
that whenever it does so it often makes up for that by taking two steps 
forward in a later case.120 Perhaps the deference displayed in Grant may be 
best understood against this background. Therefore—to our mind—the case 
law on LGBT rights fits the general bill perfectly: the rulings discussed 
showcase the Court’s propensity to assume the role of a steadfast promoter 
of European integration to all those who—up until now—were completely 
unaware of it. Furthermore, they offer conclusive evidence to those who 
failed to grasp the nettle so far, refused to do so, or needed just a little bit 
more convincing. 
 118. See, e.g., Tridimas, supra note 59, at 200; Albors Llorens, supra note 60, at 398. 
 119. OVID, EPISTULAE EX PONTO, IV, 10, 1.5 (“Gutta cavat lapidem [non vi sed saepe 
cadendo.]”) (alteration in original) (Henri de Waele & Anna van der Vleuten trans., 2011).
 120. Also, a novel doctrine or extreme interpretations is often introduced in a subtle 
and gradual way: in early cases, it is pronounced, but it may not (yet) be applied, and 
subjected to various conditions.  Then, in a later case, it will nonetheless be relied upon as an 
established precedent, and the earlier qualifications are eventually diluted or erased. This 
strategy has been observed and criticised in Garrett, Keleman & Schulz, supra note 67, at 
158; STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EU LAW 196 (1999); TREVOR C. HARTLEY,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 81–82 (5th ed. 2003).  
